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taining high and clear standards under which they must be exercised.
It is in the interest of the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiary
that a proper balance be maintained. Codification of such standards
with special emphasis on the corporate trustee52 would aid in achiev-
ing such balance."
JOHN G. ALDRiDGE
Usury-Usury as Applied to Credit Transactions
In Biblical times1 and at the early common law2 the taking of
any interest or compensation for the use of money, whether moder-
ate or excessive, was considered usurious. Laws were later passed
that allowed, but limited, the amount of interest a party could
charge on a loan or forebearance of money.3 In 1821, the case of
Beete v. Bidgood4 established the rule in England that a sale on
credit was not a loan or forebearance of money and hence the laws
against usury did not apply. This view was soon thereafter adopted
in practically all the American courts.' This doctrine allows a ven-
dor to charge one price for a cash transaction and a higher price for
the sale of the same goods on credit. The fact that the credit price
"' Due to the nature of the modem corporate trustee the need to set
separate and higher standards is becoming greater. This need has been
recognized to some extent by those authorities that require a higher degree
of care for the corporate trustee. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§ 174 (1959). Little attempt has been made, however, to set higher stan-
dards of loyalty due to the difficulty of framing such a standard. Thus day-
to-day restraints are usually imposed by the corporate trustee itself. Yet
despite this difficulty it seems that the loyalty concept merits more attention
by law making bodies than it has received.
"As to the duty of care, both Tennessee and Arkansas have codified
the "prudent man rule" as to investments and refer specifically to this stan-
dard in their powers acts. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 58-302 (Supp. 1965);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-320 (1955).
The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act in addition to adopting the prudent
man rule in § 3(a), states in § 5(b) that if the duty of the trustee and his
individual interests conflict in the exercise of a power, such power may be
exercised only by authorization of the court. This restriction excludes, how-
ever, certain powers which are violative of fiduciary principles. For a criti-
cism of these exclusions see Hallgring 812.
'Consolidated Police & Fireman's Pension Fund Comm'n v. Passiac, 23
N.J. 645, 652, 130 A.2d 377 (1957).
'Natonal Bank v. Mechanics' Nat'l Bank, 94 U.S. 437, 438 (1876).
* An Act Against Usury, 1570, 13 Eliz. I, c. 8, § IX.
'7 Barn & Cress 453, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1821).
'E.g., Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 38 (1861); Carolina Indus-
trial Bank v. Merriman, 260 N.C. 335, 132 S.E.2d 692 (1963).
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exceeds the cash price by a greater percentage than the legal rate
of interest is of no consequence since the transaction is held to be
outside the usury law. The courts predicated this doctrine on the
basis that a vendor can charge whatever price he pleases. Further-
more, the vendee is free to accept or reject the vendor's offer. On
the other hand, it is true a borrower in need of financial assistance
has no choice but to accept a loan on the lender's terms.
The modern adherance to this doctrine is typified by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Michigan Natl Bank v. Hanner,0 where
Justice Branch, speaking for the court said: "The plaintiff's plead-
ings make out a sale and installment credit transaction, not a loan.
Thus there can be no action for usury.
''7
In Hanner the defendant agreed to purchase an airplane from
Graubart Aviation Inc. for a purchase price of 59,520 dollars and
made a partial payment of 5,000 dollars by trading in a used plane.
The defendant signed in blank a conditional sales contract and note
and left them with Graubart. Later Graubart filled in the contract,
raising the sales price to 69,500 dollars and adding a finance charge
of 19,365 dollars. The defendant took possession of the plane in
January 1963 and used it until April 1963 at which time he re-
linquished it to the vendor. The plane was then sold at public auc-
tion for 40,000 dollars and the plaintiff, who was an assignees of
the conditional sales contract and note, sued for the remainder of the
unpaid purchase price and the unpaid finance charges. The defendant
- 268 N.C. 668, 151 S.E.2d 579 (1966).
71d. at 673.
8 There is a divergence of opinion as to whether a finance company who
is an assignee of a conditional sales contract can be a holder in due course.
For the proposition that it is not see Griffin v. Baltimore Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 204 Md. 154, 109 A.2d 804 (1954). See also Commercial Credit
Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940) discussed in 53
H~Av. L. REv. 1200 (1940) and 20 U. CiNc. L. REv. 123 (1951). These
courts base their decisions on the theory that the finance company was a
party to the transaction in and of itself; cf. Palmer v. Associate Discount
Corp., 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (relying on the agency theory).
Typical of the view that a finance company under such conditions may be a
holder in due course is White System of New Orleans v. Hall, 219 La.
440, 53 So. 2d 227 (1951).
A majority of the courts hold that the defense of usury is a real rather
than a personal defense and even a holder in due course holds a usurious
note subject to the usury defense. See Gilden v. Hearne, 79 Tex. 120, 14
S.W. 1031 (1890). This was reaffirmed in Lydick v. Stamps, 316 S.W.2d
107 (Ft. Worth Ct. Civ. App. 1958). The North Carolina Court seems to
have adopted this view in Overton v. Tarkington, 249 N.C. 340, 106 S.E.2d
717 (1959) (the court spoke of assignment of the debt).
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asserted the defense of usury in the nature of a counterclaim9 for
twice the amount he alleged had been charged in violation of usury
laws. The North Carolina court held that the transaction was a
sale on credit and not subject to the North Carolina usury law."0
Prior to Hanner the North Carolina court had enumerated the
elements that must be present in order that there be a violation of
the usury laws." They are: (1) A loan expressed or implied, or a
forebearance of money; (2) An understanding that the money lent
was to be returned; (3) A greater rate of interest than the legal
rate; and (4) A corrupt intent to take more than the legal rate of
interest.'2 These seem to be the same essential factors that other
courts look for in determining whether usury laws have been vio-
lated.'3
Courts consistently state that they will look to the true nature of
a transaction and not allow a subterfuge to conceal an exaction of
more than the legal rate of interest.'4 The North Carolina Supreme
Court found such a subterfuge in Ripple v. Mortgage & Acceptance
Corp.'5 There an automobile manufacturer sold automobiles to a
dealer who paid for them with his own draft and the titles to the
automobiles were put in the name of the dealer. A mortgage com-
pany was designated as vendor on conditional sales contracts. The
' See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Robeson Motors, Inc., 243 N.C. 326,
90 S.E.2d 886 (1956). When sued on a contract a defendant may assert a
counterclaim based on usury.
20 268 N.C. at 673, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1964) regulates the amount
of interest that a party can charge. It states that the legal rate of interest in
North Carolina is six per centum per annum and that the penalty for
violation is the forfeiture of the entire interest and in case a greater rate of
interest has been paid the person so paying may recover back twice the
amount paid. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-43 (1964) allows commercial banks to
charge interest in advance even though the debt is to be paid in installments.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-141 (1964) gives the same privilege to Industrial
banks.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-164 to -191 (1964) entitled "The Consumer Fi-
nance Act" provides for the licensing of small loan companies and sets out the
amount of interest they can legally charge.
" Doster v. English, 152 N.C. 339, 341, 67 S.E. 754 (1910).
"2The corrupt intent element is satisfied by the charging of a higher
interest rate than the law allows. See Associated Stores Inc. v. Industrial
Loan & Inv. Co., 202 F. Supp. 251 (E.D.N.C. 1962).
"In re Bibbey, 9 F.2d 944, 945 (8th Cir. 1925) ; Loucks v. Smith, 154
Neb. 597, 599, 48 N.W.2d 722 (1951); Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wash. 2d 378,
156 P.2d 408 (1945).
"' E.g., Dunn v. Midland Loan Fin. Corp., 266 Minn. 550, 289 N.W. 411
(1939).
1193 N.C. 422, 137 S.E.2d 156 (1927).
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court held that since the titles to the automobiles were never in the
name of the mortgage company, it could not be a vendor, and the
transaction could not possibly be a sale but was a loan of the pur-
chase price.-"
In comparing Ripple with Hanner it seems apparent that the
North Carolina court concerns itself with form rather than sub-
stance when determining the true nature of the transaction in ques-
tion. There is little substantive difference between a loan of 55,000
dollars with a charge of 30 thousand dollars interest and a sale of
an item priced at 55,000 dollars and a subsequent additional charge
of 30,000 dollars. No better statement concerning the lack of a
substantial difference in such transactions can be found than the
following by Judge Tomkins in Failing v. National Bond & Inv.
Corp.'7 He said:
In construing a statute, its purpose may not be ignored, its ob-
ject should be the polar star of the court, when the course has
become obscured by decisions where, manifestly, the port for the
time, has been lost.... If it is the needy individual whose pro-
tection usury laws are inacted to guard, is the need of him who
borrows that he may buy for cash, greater than his, who pur-
chases on credit?... Tweedledum and tweedledee have no place
in the law today, which professes to seek the truth; whose aim
is justice.' 8
The attitude of the North Carolina court seems to be shared by the
vast majority of the state and federal courts, which, though they
state that they will examine the transaction, rarely find anything but
a bona fide credit sale transaction. 9
The courts of Arkansas20 and Nebraska2' have realized the futil-
18Id. at 427.
17 108 Misc. 617, 6 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Rochester City Ct. 1938) rev'd at 12
N.Y.S.2d 260 (Monroe County Ct. 1938) reversal aff'd at 14 N.Y.S.2d 1011
(App. Div. 1939).
186 N.Y.S.2d at 71, 72.
"E.g., Rose v. Wheeler, 35 P.2d 220 (Cal. 1934); Wyatt v. Commercial
Credit Corp., 341 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1950); Yeager v. Ainsworth, 202 Miss.
747, 32 So. 2d 548 (1947) (proof of usury must be clear, positive and
certain) ; Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wash. 2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 (1945) (a person
may sell at any price and if bona fide it can not be usurious) ; Indian Lake
Estates, Inc. v. Special Inv. Inc., 154 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)
(before there can be usury there must be a loan).
20220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
11 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963). There is some doubt that the
Nebraska court actually vitiated the doctrine that a credit transaction is
exempt from usury law because it specifically refused to overrule Grand
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ity of attempting to distinguish between a credit sale and a loan or
forebearance of money and treat the two as identical for usury
purposes. Thus, any mark-up over the cash price will be treated as
interest in these jurisdictions.2"
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have recognized the
anomaly that exists in the application of the usury laws and have
undertaken an exhaustive study of the entire field of consumer credit
for the purpose of drafting comprehensive uniform or model state
legislation.' This study is at the request of the council of state
governments. Substantial impetus for the study was provided by the
bills entitled "Truth in Lending" introduced in Congress by Sena-
tor Douglas of Illinois. Creditors would, under this legislation, be
required to tell the consumer in terms that they can understand what
they are paying for credit.2 5 Generally speaking the Douglas Bill
would require all consumer credit suppliers to state their finance
charges in terms of an annual interest rate and in terms of a dollar
amount. The proposed benefit to the consumer rests on the theory
that there is an increasing amount of competition among creditors
for consumer credit and in order for the consumer to benefit from
this competition he must know which of two creditors offers the
better credit price.
Conceding that a party may set one price for a cash transaction
and a much higher price for the sale of the same goods on credit,
it would seem, under basic contract principals, that the higher price
must be agreed upon by both parties in order to consumate an en-
forceable contract. The decision in Hanner seems to be vulnerable
Island Fin. Co. v. Fowler, 124 Neb. 514, 247 N.W.2d 203 (1933) which
established the doctrine in Nebraska. In the later case of G.M.A.C. v.
Mackril, 175 Neb. 631, 122 N.W.2d 742 the Nebraska Court said: "Regard-
less of the term used this item is a charge for the loan of money or for the
forebearance of a debt. Disguise it by any name or title we will, it is and
remains interest." Id. at 636, 122 N.W.2d at 746.
22220 Ark. at 607; 175 Neb. at 496. Other states have adopted a very
strict view in regard to aggregation of interest which is contra to the North
Carolina view set forth in note 7 supra. These states allow a bank to charge
only the amount of interest which has been earned prior to the payment of
each installment payment. A statement by the court in Dowler v. Georgia
Enterprises, Inc., 162 Tenn. 59, 34 S.W.2d 445 (1930) is illustrative of this
view. It said: "Payments are first applied to the discharge of interest ac-
crued at the date of each partial payment." Id. at 62, 34 S.W.2d at 448.
2 Buerger, Project On Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small
Loans and Usury, 18 PER. FiN. Q. 110 (1963).
2" S. 2275 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
2 S. 2275 § 4 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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on this point; but on closer examination, Hanner can probably be
justified on the theory that the use of the plane for two months
operated as an acceptance of the higher price.6 In this factual respect
Hanner differs from the practice indulged in by some retail stores.
Under this practice a purchase is made of an item at a certain price
and no mention is made of a credit price. The customer is then
charged interest at rates as high as one and one-half per cent on the
unpaid balance at the end of each month." This is interest at the
rate of eighteen per cent per annum. The legislation proposed by
Senator Douglas would require that a creditor in an open end credit
transaction (1) provide to the buyer a clear statement in writing,
setting forth the simple annual percentage rate at which a finance
charge will be imposed on the monthly balance and (2) furnish to
each person at the end of each month a statement setting forth the
simple annual percentage rate at which a finance charge has been
imposed on the monthly balance.Ys
Usury statutes have, since their inception, been considered a valid
exercise of the police power of the state.2" The traditional justifica-
tion rests in the theory that a needy borrower is compelled to accept
the terms of a merciless lender. Therefore, the legislature protected
the needy borrower against unconscionable rates of interest. It is
submitted that a needy consumer, buying a necessity of life, is just
as much at the mercy of the greedy merchant as a needy borrower
seeking a loan from a voracious lender.
In the modern world the volume of credit buying is much greater
than in the days of Beete v. Bidgood. 0 It has been estimated that
the total volume of consumer credit, exclusive of home mortgage
financing, approximates seventy billion dollars each year."- Con-
sumer products comprise the largest portion of the total credit buy-
ing today and most of these products fall in the category of "neces-
sities." The need seems apparent for some form of relief against
28 268 N.C. at 669. It should be noted that the appeal in Hanner was
taken from the trial court's striking of the defendant's counterclaim based on
usury; the enforceability of the original contract was probably not before
the court.
2TThis charge is usually referred to as a carrying charge.
28 S. 2275 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
"' State ex rel Ornstine v. Cary, 126 Wis. 135, 140, 104 N.W. 792
(1905), writ of error dismissed 204 U.S. 669 (1906).
20 See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
2 Buerger, Project On Retail Invest ent Sales, Consumer Credit, Small
Loans and Usury, 18 PnR. FIN. Q. 110, 111 (1963).
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the type of credit transaction discussed herein, either from the legis-
lature or from the courts. The statutes against usury should be
extended to include credit sale transactions. Until such statutory
protection is afforded, a more realistic application of the "true
nature of the transaction" rule would provide some degree of pro-
tection to the consumer.
BiLLY RL BARR
